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I INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, mechanisms exist to offer support and protection to those who 
need it most, including children. Such safeguards are particularly important for 
children who do not have the competence to understand or make medical 
decisions for themselves due to their young age. This group is referred to as 
‘young children’ throughout this article.1 As a society, we arguably have a moral 
obligation to ensure this support and protection is offered to this vulnerable 
group.2  
However, this article argues that the legal principles in each Australian 
jurisdiction governing some invasive medical procedures on young children fail 
to offer the necessary protection.  Although the conclusions made in this article 
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1  This group lacks ‘sufficient understanding and intelligence’ to understand the nature and consequences of 
the particular medical treatment: Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (1992) 
175 CLR 218, 237 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (‘Marion’s Case’), referring to the test 
originally established in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 189 
(Lord Scarman) (‘Gillick’). The development of this understanding and intelligence will vary from child 
to child. 
2  M D A Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of Children (Frances Pinter, 1983) 35. 
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may apply to a range of invasive medical procedures,3 its focus is on tissue 
removal from a young child for the purpose of transplantation to another. 
The removal of tissue for transplantation into another person is an invasive 
procedure that, in some Australian jurisdictions and subject to certain conditions, 
may lawfully be carried out on young children.4 At common law, parents 
generally have the authority to make medical decisions on behalf of children.  
While Gillick-competent children who have sufficient intelligence and maturity 
to understand the nature and consequences of the particular medical treatment 
may legally consent to medical treatment,5 this does not apply to young children 
who do not yet have the requisite ‘understanding and intelligence’ to provide 
consent.6 Where parents have authority to make medical decisions on behalf of 
the child, this authority is limited by the need for the decision to be made in the 
best interests of the child. However, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its 
parens patriae jurisdiction, can override decisions of parents if the Court 
considers it to be required by the best interests of the child.7 For some special 
                                                 
3  The most obvious invasive medical procedure that is subject to differing regimes around Australia is that 
of sterilisation of children without capacity (usually by reason of disability). This difficult topic has been 
discussed at length in the literature: see, eg, Natasha Cica, ‘Sterilising the Intellectually Disabled: The 
Approach of the High Court of Australia in Department of Health v JWB and SMB’ (1993) 1 Medical 
Law Review 186; Ian Freckelton, ‘Sterilisation of Intellectually Disabled Minors’ (2007) 14 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 299; Jennifer Ford, ‘The Sterilisation of Young Women with an Intellectual Disability: 
A Comparison between the Family Court of Australia and the Guardianship Board of New South Wales’ 
(1996) 10 Australian Journal of Family Law 236; Alexandra George, ‘Sterilisation and Intellectually 
Disabled Children: In the matter of P & P’ (1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 218; Nahum Mushin, ‘Special 
Medical Procedures, Sterilisation of Minors and the Role of the Family Court’ (2007) 14 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 199; Helen Rhoades, ‘Intellectual Disability and Sterilisation – An Inevitable 
Connection?’ (1995) 9 Australian Journal of Family Law 234; Linda Steele, ‘Making Sense of the Family 
Court’s Decisions on the Non-Therapeutic Sterilisation of Girls with Intellectual Disability’ (2008) 22 
Australian Journal of Family Law 1; David Tait, Terry Carney and Kirsten Deane, ‘Legal Regulation of 
Sterilisation: The Role of Guardianship Tribunals in NSW and Victoria’ (1994) 8 Australian Journal of 
Family Law 141. 
4  This article excludes from specific consideration the position of children without capacity by reason of 
disability. There are documented cases in the US of disabled children without capacity being used as 
tissue donors: David P T Price, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 348. However this scenario is likely to be rare. The legal position of such 
children in Australia may also be different due to the way the relevant tissue transplantation legislation 
around Australia has been drafted and the potential interaction with guardianship legislation in some 
jurisdictions.  
5  Gillick [1986] AC 112, 189 (Lord Scarman). 
6  See above n 1 and accompanying text. 
7  See, eg, Re Heather [2003] NSWSC 532 (12 June 2003). 
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medical procedures parental consent will be insufficient and court authorisation 
is required.8 
Tissue transplantation is also subject to state and territory legislative regimes, 
the common law parens patriae jurisdiction and the federal jurisdiction under the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘FL Act’). Therefore, this issue offers a good 
example of the overlap, inconsistency and general confusion the law has created 
for young children, their parents and the medical practitioners involved. 
Framed within children’s vulnerability and this diffuse constitutional context, 
this article considers the operation of the specific state and territory regimes 
relating to tissue transplantation in young children before setting out the 
operation of the parens patriae jurisdiction, and finally turning to the effect of 
the federal jurisdiction under the FL Act on these. This analysis of the law will 
highlight the inconsistency between the current legal position and Australia’s 
obligations created through it being a signatory to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.9 The CRC places obligations on member states to give effect to the 
principle of the best interests of the child;10 in addition, it highlights the need to 
allow children to participate in decisions affecting them.11 Although the 
Australian government has stated that ‘a determination of the best interests of the 
child is the key principle in most legislation concerning children in Australian, 
state and territory jurisdictions’,12 this article aims to show that this has not 
occurred in relation to removal of tissue from children for the purposes of 
transplantation. 
This article concludes by considering avenues for reform and suggesting a 
system modelled on the UK regime, which allows different jurisdictions to 
coexist while empowering a centralised body to authorise the procedures. 
 
                                                 
8  For example, sterilisation, sex change operations and abortions require court authorisation prior to these 
procedures being carried out on children without capacity to make their own decisions: Secretary, 
Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218, 249–54 (Mason 
CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (Marion’s Case); Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 124 (Nicholson CJ); 
Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562, 565 [17] (Wilson J). There is conflicting Federal Court authority as 
to whether a transplantation procedure is such a ‘special procedure’: Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 288, 
290 (Cronin J); Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421, 425–6 (Hannon J). See below Part II(A). There exist other 
limiting factors on the parents’ right to consent, including where a child is Gillick-competent (that is, the 
child has sufficient intelligence and maturity to understand the nature and consequences of the particular 
medical treatment): see above n 1 and accompanying text. 
9 Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 
September 1990) (‘CRC’). 
10  CRC art 3, which provides: ‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration.’ 
11  CRC art 12. See also UNICEF, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNICEF, 3rd ed, 2007) 149. 
12  Australian Government, Fourth Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Attorney-
General’s Department, 2009) 15 citing Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CA, which provides that the best 
interests of a child are the paramount consideration in making parenting orders concerning a child.  
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II TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 
The removal of tissue from a child for transplantation into another is a 
procedure fraught with ethical uncertainties.13 Questions arise as to whether such 
a medically invasive procedure should be carried out when it is of no physical 
benefit to the child providing tissue.14 While recognising that difficult ethical 
issues arise, the focus in this article is on the legality of these transplantation 
procedures.  
The following case study is used as the basis for our examination of the 
jurisdictional overlap and inconsistencies that arise in Australia: 
Tina is seven years old and lives with her mother, Sandra. Tina has a brother, 
Nathan, who is three years old. Sandra separated from her husband, Frank, two 
years ago. Since then, Sandra and Tina have lived together, and Frank and 
Nathan have lived together in a town two hours away. Nathan has a 
hepatoblastoma (a malignant liver tumour) that has been unsuccessfully treated 
with chemotherapy. His doctor now advises that the best treatment would be for 
him to receive a liver transplant. However, as this will need to be carried out 
soon, the chances of a deceased donor liver becoming available are slim. Sandra, 
Frank and other close relatives are tested but ruled out as potential donors due to 
pre-existing medical conditions. Tina is tested and found to be a suitable match. 
Tina hates going to the doctors and becomes distressed when examined. Sandra 
and Frank have tried to explain the procedure to her but she does not understand. 
Sandra and Frank wish to proceed with the removal of liver tissue from Tina to 
be donated to Nathan. 
The case of Tina raises several legal issues that Sandra and Frank, Tina, and 
the medical practitioner must navigate. At common law, can Sandra and Frank 
consent to such a procedure, or does it require court authorisation? Even if they 
can consent, does the procedure fall within the tissue transplantation regimes in 
specific state and territory legislation? Can they bypass the state regimes and 
seek an order from the Supreme Court or under the welfare jurisdiction of the FL 
Act? 
 
A Liver Transplantations and Parental Consent 
Few cases such as Tina’s have come before the courts and these have been 
limited to the situation where a young child is being considered as a potential 
                                                 
13  See, eg, Mark Sheldon, ‘Guest Editorial: Children and Organ Donors: A Persistent Ethical Issue’ (2004) 
13 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 119; Lainie Friedman Ross, ‘Moral Grounding for the 
Participation of Children as Organ Donors’ (1993) 21 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 251; James 
Dwyer and Elizabeth Vig, ‘Rethinking Transplantation between Siblings’ (1995) 25(5) Hastings Center 
Report 7; Price, above n 4, 334–47. 
14  In addition, medical advances have created the ability to select and implant embryos for the specific 
purpose of future tissue donation from the child conceived. This issue has been discussed in Shih-Ning 
Then, ‘The Legality of Tissue Transplants for the Benefit of Family Members in the UK and Australia: 
Implications for Saviour Siblings’ (2009) 10 Medical Law International 23. Although beyond the scope 
of this article, this highlights the complex ethical issues involved in this area. 
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bone marrow donor.15 These cases have debated whether that type of tissue 
transplantation from one child for the benefit of another is a ‘special medical 
procedure’, taking it outside the realm of parental consent and requiring 
authorisation from the courts. 
In Marion’s Case, it was concluded that ‘non-therapeutic’ sterilisation was a 
‘special medical procedure’.16 This was because the procedure required 
‘invasive, irreversible and major surgery’, there was a significant risk of a wrong 
decision being made (due to the complexity of the question of consent, the social 
and psychological as well as medical effects of consent and the conflicts of 
interests that may occur for the parent), and the grave consequences of making 
the incorrect decision.17 
The most recent authority, Re Inaya, suggests that, unlike sterilisation, 
consenting to the removal of bone marrow tissue is within the scope of the 
parental authority, although subject to any legislative regulation or prohibition.18 
However, it is unlikely that removal of a section of the liver is the same as 
removing bone marrow. Like the removal of bone marrow, the procedure is one 
that creates an inherent conflict of interest for parents, as it will often involve 
weighing up the interests of both their donor child and the family member 
recipient.19 However, unlike a bone marrow transplant, a liver resection is likely 
to be considered major surgery and is not a ‘routine operation with minimal risks 
commonly performed on young children’.20 In any case, a court order is 
necessary, as in Re Inaya, if the matter is otherwise prohibited by state or 
territory legislation. 
 
B The Law Relating to Tissue Removal from a Child for the Benefit of 
Another 
To determine the legal position of Sandra, Frank, any medical practitioners 
involved, and of course Tina, an examination of the relevant state, territory and 
federal legislation and the common law is required.  
 
                                                 
15  Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421; Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278.  Note also E v E [1999] FamCA 2403, where 
an application was made to allow a Gillick-competent child to donate bone marrow or undergo peripheral 
blood collection.   
16  (1992) 175 CLR 218, 250–2 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
17  Ibid.  
18  (2007) 213 FLR 278. Although Cronin J qualifies this statement that this is the case to the extent that 
legislation expressly provides that parental consent is sufficient, and subject to certain requirements being 
fulfilled: at 288. Contra Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421, 425–6 (Hannon J); E v E [1999] FamCA 2403. 
19  See, eg, Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562, 565, where Wilson J considered that a decision as to 
termination of pregnancy was outside ordinary parental consent because there was potential for the 
parents to make a decision which ‘favours other and possibly conflicting interests of the family as a 
whole’. See also World Health Organization Executive Board, Human Organ and Tissue 
Transplantation, 62nd World Health Assembly, Provisional Agenda Item 12.10, A62/15, Annex ‘WHO 
Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation’, Guiding Principle 4 Commentary 
(29 March 2009). Conflict of interest is discussed further at Part II(F). 
20  Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 287 (Cronin J). 
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1 State and Territory Statutory Regimes for Regenerative Tissue21 
Each Australian jurisdiction has a separate regime for the removal of blood,22 
regenerative tissue and non-regenerative tissue.23 For the purposes of assessing 
Tina’s situation – which relates to a liver transplant – the regimes relating to 
removal of regenerative tissues from children are most relevant. All jurisdictions, 
with the exception of the Northern Territory, have specific provisions relating to 
children.24  
Tissue is commonly defined as including an organ, or part, of a human body 
and a substance extracted from, or from a part of, the human body.25 
Regenerative tissue generally means ‘tissue that, after injury or removal, is 
replaced in the body of a living person by natural processes of growth or 
repair’.26 The definition of regenerative tissue includes bone marrow, one of the 
most common types of transplantable tissue.27 With recent advances in transplant 
techniques, liver tissue also arguably comes within the scope of regenerative 
transplantable tissue.28 However, removal of liver tissue is an invasive procedure 
– in that respect more akin to the removal of non-regenerative tissue – with a 
                                                 
21  The relevant legislation are: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT); Human Tissue Act 1983 
(NSW); Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979 (NT); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld); 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas); Human Tissue Act 1982 
(Vic); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA). 
22  For the legal framework regarding blood removal generally see: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 
(ACT) pt 2 div 2.5; Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) pt 3 div 2; Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 
(Qld) pt 2 div 4; Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) pt 2 div 5; Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) pt 
2 div 5; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) pt 3; Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) pt 2 div 5.  
23  In all jurisdictions except the ACT, the removal of non-regenerative tissue from children is expressly or 
impliedly prohibited in all jurisdictions: see below n 32; Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) 
 s 12; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 14(1); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 12(2). In the 
ACT, removal of non-regenerative tissue from a child is allowed in circumstances where parental consent 
is given, the child understands the nature and effect of the procedure and agrees, and a Minister appointed 
committee authorises the procedure: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 14. 
24  The legislation in the Northern Territory has no specific provisions for removal of regenerative tissue 
from children, but provides that any removal not in accordance with the Act is an offence: Human Tissue 
Transplant Act 1979 (NT) s 27(1).  
25  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 2; Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 4(1); 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 5(1); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) 3(1); Human Tissue 
Act 1982 (Vic) s 3(1); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 3(1). In Queensland, the definition 
is more explicit: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 4(1). 
26  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 2; Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 4(1); 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 5(1); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) 3(1); Human Tissue 
Act 1982 (Vic) s 3(1); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 3(1); Transplantation and 
Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 4(1). 
27  The exception to this is Western Australia, where the definition of blood includes bone marrow: Human 
Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 3(1). This means that bone marrow harvests will come under the 
statutory regime for blood, see Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) pt 2 div 2.5; Human Tissue 
Act 1983 (NSW) pt 3 div 2; Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) pt 2 div 4; Transplantation and 
Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) pt 2 div 5; Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) pt 2 div 5; Human Tissue Act 1982 
(Vic) pt 3; Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) pt 2 div 5. 
28  The liver of a donor typically regenerates to a median 89 per cent of the original liver size: Silvio Nadalin 
et al, ‘Current Trends in Live Liver Donation’ (2007) 20 Transplant International 312, 325. 
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higher risk of adverse outcomes than kidney donation.29 This has led some 
professional bodies to consider that liver resections should not be carried out on 
child donors.30  Despite this, the removal of liver tissue would be treated at law 
in the same way as other regenerative tissues. 
Removal of regenerative tissue from children for the purpose of 
transplantation into another person is usually restricted to transplants to family 
members.31 The legislation in all Australian jurisdictions makes it an offence to 
remove tissue except in accordance with a consent or authority under the relevant 
Act;32 all Acts provide a defence to this offence where the act is authorised by 
another law.33 In Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria there is also an 
express prohibition in the statute against removal of regenerative tissue from a 
                                                 
29  Perioperative mortality for living kidney donation is reported at 0.03 per cent: Arthur J Matas et al, 
‘Morbidity and Mortality after Living Kidney Donation, 1999–2001: Survey of US Transplant Centers’ 
(2003) 3 American Journal of Transplantation 830, 833. Cf the risk of death for live liver donors, which 
is quoted by transplant centres around the world as being between 0.2–2 per cent: Nadalin et al, above 
 n 28, 323.  
30  See American Medical Association, Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs, CEJA Report 3 – I-93 The 
Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue Donors (1993) 4, 10 
<http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_3i93.pdf>; Council of Europe, Committee of 
Ministers, Recommendation No R (97) 16 on Liver Transplantation from Living Donors (30 September 
1997). See also Nadalin et al, above n 28, 313. 
31  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 13(1) (family member or relative of the child); Human 
Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) ss 10 (parent, brother or sister of the child), 11A (brother or sister of the child); 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) ss 12B, 12D (parent, brother or sister of the child); Human 
Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) s 12 (family member or relative of the child); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic)  
 ss 15(1) (parent, brother or sister of the child), (2)(d) (brother or sister of the child); Human Tissue and 
Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 13(1) (family member or relative of the child). Note, in South Australia, 
regenerative tissue may be transplanted into ‘another living person’, but this is subject to approval by a 
Minister appointed committee: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 13. Children are generally 
defined in the legislation as persons who have not yet reached 18 years and are not married: see Human 
Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 4(1); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 5(1); Human Tissue Act 
1985 (Tas) s 3(1); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 3(1). In the ACT, the person must be under the age of 
18 years and not in a domestic relationship: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 2. In 
Western Australia, there is no requirement for the person not to be married: Human Tissue and 
Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 3(1). The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) contains no 
definition of a ‘child’, but the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 36 defines a child in as an individual 
under the age of 18 years. 
32  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 48(1); Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 36(1); Human 
Tissue Transplant Act 1979 (NT) s 27(1); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 48(1) (note this 
provision creates a prohibition to remove tissue for any of the purposes referred to in ss 10–11; whilst 
these do not specifically relate to children, it seems the purposes are applicable to children and this would 
have the same effect as equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 
1983 (SA) ss 12(b), 38(1)(a); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) s 30(1); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic)  
 ss 14(2), 44(1); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) ss 12(1), 33(1)(a).  
33  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 48(5)(b); Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 36(4)(c); 
Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979 (NT) s 27(3)(b); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld)  
 s 48(3)(b); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 38(3)(c); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas)  
 s 30(4)(b); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 44(5)(b); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) 
 s 33(3)(c). 
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child for the purposes of transplantation other than as provided for in the 
legislation.34 
The majority of jurisdictions provide a process for removal of regenerative 
tissue from children where a parent has consented, the child has capacity to 
understand the nature and effect of the removal of the tissue and the nature of the 
transplantation, and the medical practitioner is satisfied both the parent and the 
child understand and agree.35 However, few jurisdictions address the situation 
where the child (such as Tina) lacks the capacity to understand the nature and 
effect of the removal of the regenerative tissue and the nature of the 
transplantation.36  
Currently in Australia, despite the possibility to do so, there are no 
documented live liver donations from young children.37 Therefore, it is readily 
acknowledged that Tina’s scenario is unlikely to occur in practice. However, an 
examination of Tina’s case demonstrates that it is possible that such a risky and 
invasive procedure could legally be performed without the supervision of a court. 
Given that liver transplantation has only developed as a treatment in the last 
couple of decades (following the commencement of the relevant legislation), and 
the relatively high risks to the donor,38 the current law is considered outdated,39 
and inadequate in its protection of young children.40  
The relevant state and territory legislation explored below sets out two 
general positions – that in Western Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory, and that in NSW, Victoria and Queensland. 
South Australian law largely falls into the former category, but is considered 
separately below due to some idiosyncrasies. 
                                                 
34  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 12(b); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 14(2); Human 
Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 12(1). 
35  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 13; Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) ss 10, 11; 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) ss 12B, 12C; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 15; Human 
Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) s 13. Note that Tasmania provides that the parent and child must 
jointly consent: Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) ss 12, 13. Note, in South Australia, in addition to this 
requirement, a committee appointed by the Minister must also approve the consent: Transplantation and 
Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 13. 
36  See Part II(B)(1)(c), below. 
37  Australia and New Zealand Liver Transplant Registry, 20th Report (2009) 31. The previous report does 
not specify the age of the live liver donors. See also views expressed in the professional literature: 
Nadalin et al, above n 28, 313; and the legal literature in the UK: J K Mason and G T Laurie, Mason and 
McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2006) 488. Compare this with 
the position in the US where the National Data Report from 1 January 1988 – 26 July 2010 show that six 
children between the ages of 11–17 years acted as living liver donors. This information was obtained by 
selecting data for living liver donors by age via the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
website: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Living Donors Recovered in the U.S. by 
Donor Age (2010) <http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp>.  
38  See Matas et al, above n 29.  
39  For comments regarding the Victorian legislation: see Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 282 (Cronin J). 
40  Cf the position in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, where the legislation provides different 
procedures for the removal of bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells from young children 
compared with the removal of an organ or part of an organ: Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30, ss 33(3), 
(7); Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons Who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 
(UK) regs 10(1), (3)(b), 11, 12(1)–(2).  
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(a) Western Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory and Northern 
Territory 
In Western Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory, there is no provision for allowing the removal of regenerative 
tissue from a child who does not understand the procedure. Given the offence 
provisions contained in those statutes, if independent parental authority to 
consent to such a procedure ever did exist at common law (and this appears 
unlikely), it has been wholly removed.41 In order to proceed in these 
jurisdictions, Sandra and Frank would need to explore other avenues such as 
seeking an order under the common law parens patriae jurisdiction or under the 
FL Act. These options are discussed further below in Parts II(B)(2), II(C) and 
II(D).   
 
(b) South Australia 
Similarly, South Australia has no provision allowing removal of regenerative 
tissue from a young child. However, also potentially relevant in South Australia 
is legislation dealing with medical decision making for children in a broader 
context. The Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) 
relevantly allows a medical practitioner to ‘administer medical treatment to a 
child if … the parent or guardian consents’.42 Given that the definition of medical 
treatment under that Act is technically wide enough to encompass a procedure 
such as removal of tissue for transplantation,43 it is arguable that this section 
grants parents the right to consent to such a procedure. As a matter of statutory 
interpretation however it appears the more specific regime in the Transplantation 
and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) is likely to operate as an exception to the general 
scheme.44 
 
                                                 
41  See, eg, Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 48(1); Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 36(1); 
Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979 (NT) s 27(1); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 48(1) 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) ss 12(b), 38(1)(a); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) s 30(1); 
Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) ss 14(2), 44(1); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) ss 12(1), 
33(1)(a).  
42  Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 12(a).  
43  This is despite the fact that such a procedure would not normally come within the meaning of ‘treatment’ 
as it is commonly understood. Medical treatment is defined as meaning ‘treatment or procedures 
administered or carried out by a medical practitioner in the course of medical or surgical practice or by a 
dentist in the course of dental practice and includes the prescription or supply of drugs’: Consent to 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 4.  
44  See comments by the Privy Council in Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd v Wyong Shire Council 
[1974] 2 NSWLR 681, 686. See also the discussion in Rebecca Bailey-Harris, ‘Sterilisation, Children and 
the Constitution’ (1995) 1 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 2, 16 n 63.  
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(c) Victoria, New South Wales45 and Queensland 
In contrast with the jurisdictions above, the legislation in Victoria, NSW and 
Queensland specifically provides that parental consent is sufficient for the 
removal of regenerative tissue from a child who is incapable of understanding by 
reason of age,46 as long as certification is provided by medical practitioner(s) and 
the relevant statutory criteria are satisfied.  
The legislation requires that the tissue to be removed and transplanted is 
regenerative and that the tissue recipient (the donor child’s brother or sister, or 
additionally in the case of Queensland, the child’s parent)47 is ‘likely to die’48 or, 
in NSW, to ‘suffer serious and irreversible damage to his or her health’.49  
The regimes differ across the jurisdictions. NSW requires: 
! a medical practitioner to certify that a parent gave consent with an 
understanding the nature and effect of the removal of the tissue and the 
transplant; and 
! two medical practitioners – one being a specialist in paediatric medicine 
or paediatric transplants and not involved in the care of the sibling – to 
certify that: 
    the child is not capable of understanding the nature and effect of the 
removal of tissue and the transplant;  
    that any risk to the child’s health (including psychological and 
emotional health) caused by the removal of the tissue is minimal; 
and 
    and that the sibling is likely to die or suffer serious and irreversible 
damage to his or her health.50  
Where these requirements are satisfied, another medical practitioner can 
carry out the procedure.51  
                                                 
45  Note that in NSW, a provision similar to section 12 of the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative 
Care Act 1995 (SA) (discussed above) is contained in Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW) 
s 49. Section 49(1) provides that a parent to give valid consent for medical treatment of their child below 
16 years of age, but it is limited in scope in that it only applies to ‘a claim by the minor for assault or 
battery’. Section 49(2) provides protection against a claim of assault or battery by a child where the child 
is 14 years or over and has consented. However, this section does not confer general capacity on a child 
to consent to medical treatment: K v Minister for Youth and Community Services [1982] 1 NSWLR 311, 
321 (Helsham CJ in Eq); NSW Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’), Young People and Consent to 
Health Care, Report No 119 (2008) 89–91 [4.27]–[4.32]; NSWLRC, Minors’ Consent to Medical 
Treatment, Issues Paper No 24 (2004) [2.17]. 
46  Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) ss 10, 11A(1); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) ss 12B, 
12D(1); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) ss 15(1), (2)(d)(ii). 
47  NSW and Victoria provide for removal of tissue for siblings only: Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW)  
 s 11A(1)(d)(ii); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 15(2)(d)(i). Queensland provides for removal of tissue 
for siblings and parents: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 12D(1)(b).  
48  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 12D(1)(b); Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW)   
 s 11A(i)(d)(ii); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 15(2)(d)(i). 
49  Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 11A(1)(d)(ii). 
50  Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 11A. 
51  Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 14(2).  
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Similar requirements exist in Queensland except that three medical 
practitioners are required to certify that the preconditions have been satisfied in 
the presence of a designated officer.52 On the other hand, Victoria does not have 
the majority of these procedural safeguards; the legislation only requires 
certification from one medical practitioner, with no other criteria such as 
consideration of risk to the child.53 No court authorisation is legally necessary in 
these jurisdictions as long as the legislative requirements are satisfied and the 
medical practitioner performing the tissue removal is satisfied the consent is 
effective.54 
Notable in each of these jurisdictions’ legislation is the absence of the best 
interests test.55 In NSW 56 and Queensland57 this has been replaced by a 
‘minimal’ risk test. In Victoria there is no requirement for direct consideration of 
the donor child’s welfare. Given the risk involved,58 it seems likely that most 
medical practitioners would not consider that the risk to Tina’s health would be 
‘minimal’ were she used as a donor. This would then prevent the lawful removal 
of tissue from Tina in accordance with the legislation in Queensland and NSW, 
but would be no impediment in Victoria.  
In addition, the position of a young child who objects is unclear59 – 
particularly in Queensland and Victoria. There is no specific provision for taking 
into account a child’s objection during the decision making process.60 However, 
it appears that a child’s objection may operate to make the consent ineffective. 
                                                 
52  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) ss 12B, 12D, 12E, 14A. 
53  Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) ss 15–16. 
54  For circumstances where consent will not be sufficient authority: see Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) 
 s 15; Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 15; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 17.  
55  Cf the position under the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction or federal jurisdiction exercised under 
the FL Act discussed in Part (II)(C)(1), below.  
56  Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 11A(1)(d)(iii). Section 11A(2)(b)(i) also specifies that an opinion must 
be provided for by a medical practitioner ‘whose primary role in providing an opinion in the case is to 
ensure the health of the child from whom the tissue is to be removed.’ 
57 Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 12D(1)(c). 
58  See Nadalin et al, above n 28; Matas et al, above n 29. 
59  This is particularly so as the legislation does not create any legal obligation to seek the child’s views 
during the decision-making process.  
60  Cf the position in Scotland, where there must be no evidence of a child’s ‘unwillingness to be a donor’ 
prior to the procedure being authorised: Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (Scot) ss 17(1)(a), (4); 
Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (Scot) reg 5(9)(i). See also 
Price, above n 4, 359–60. The importance of taking into account the child’s objection has been 
highlighted by the World Health Organisation: World Health Organization Executive Board, above n 19, 
9;  Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation of 
Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, opened for signature 24 January 2002, ETS No 186 (entered into 
force 1 May 2006) art 14 (‘Additional Protocol to the CHRB’). Another vulnerable cohort where the ‘best 
interests’ test is applied at common law is that of adults without capacity: see Northern Sydney and 
Central Coast Area Health Service v CT (by his tutor ET) [2005] NSWSC 551 (10 June 2005) [26] 
(Nicholas J); Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] 2 FCR 172, 175. In Victoria and 
Queensland, there is a statutory requirement to take into account the views or objections of such adults 
with incapacity where they are being considered as tissue donors: Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld) s 69(2); Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 38(1)(a). 
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The position in NSW is clearest; where a young child ‘has at least some 
understanding of the procedures involved’ and has ‘repeatedly and consistently 
expressed an unwillingness to undergo any such procedures’, this will make any 
prior consent insufficient.61 The position in Queensland and Victoria is 
ambiguous; the legislation states that a consent will not be sufficient authority 
where a child is no longer (or in Queensland, ‘not’) in ‘agreement’ with the 
procedure.62 It is not clear if these provisions are meant to apply to young 
children, as – unlike children with capacity to understand – their agreement was 
at no time required during the decision making process.63 There is also no 
guidance provided to the medical practitioner as to how the lack of agreement 
must be demonstrated. 
This failure to take into account a young child’s views during the decision 
making process and the ambiguity regarding the effect of any objection by a 
child in Queensland and Victoria is undesirable. Just because a child does not yet 
have capacity does not mean that a child’s views or objections should not be 
heard and considered. Article 12 of the CRC requires nations to ensure children 
who are capable of forming their own view the right to express those views freely 
in all matters affecting them and for their views to be given due weight according 
to their age and maturity. In addition children must be given the opportunity to be 
heard in judicial or administrative proceedings affecting them, either directly or 
through a representative.64 
If an application for authorisation of a similar procedure came before a court 
and the child expressed an objection, that court would need to take that objection 
into consideration in making a decision.65 Such matters, as is shown below, will 
likely be taken into account in the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court and also under the jurisdiction conferred by the FL Act.  
These regimes result in a young child in Queensland and Victoria being in a 
different and arguably less protected position compared with similar children in 
other Australian jurisdictions. 
 
2 The Common Law 
So far, the position in Australia appears relatively clear; legislation in each 
jurisdiction either regulates or prohibits the removal of tissue from young 
children for the benefit of others. However, the general common law regarding 
                                                 
61  Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 15(d). 
62  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 15(c); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 17(c). See also 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 21; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 19. Cf Human Tissue 
Act 1983 (NSW) s 17, which only applies to children who have capacity to understand and agree. 
63  However, contrast this with the position of children who are able to understand the nature and effect of 
the procedure: Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld) s 12C; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic)  
 s 15(2)(c). 
64  CRC art 12. See also art 24. 
65  See, eg, Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CC(3)(a), 60CD; Minister for Health v AS (2004) 29 WAR 517, 
228 [23] (Pullen J); Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children v J (2005) 33 Fam LR 448, 456–7 (Einstein 
J). See also Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 88 (Balcombe 
LJ), 93 (Nolan LJ) for similar statements from the UK.  
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medical procedures, through which state and territory Supreme Courts can 
exercise parens patriae jurisdiction to authorise procedures in the best interests 
of a child, exists (at least in some jurisdictions) in parallel to the legislation.66 
 
(a) Parens Patriae Jurisdiction 
The parens patriae jurisdiction comes from the jurisdiction of the English 
Court of Chancery in the 18th century to make orders protecting the welfare of 
children. This devolved from the sovereign responsibility to protect vulnerable 
members of the community.67 The parens patriae jurisdiction was incorporated 
as part of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts of the states and territories as a 
consequence of the Acts creating those Courts.68 The parens patriae jurisdiction 
is not limited to those activities that are within parental consent. 
A number of cases indicate that the continued operation of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction in conjunction with the state and territory legislation is likely.69 In 
Minister of State for the Interior of the Commonwealth v Neyens, Barwick CJ 
stated that the parens patriae jurisdiction would only be ousted if done so 
‘expressly or by necessary, indeed inescapable, implication’.70 This was 
confirmed in Carseldine v Director of Department of Children’s Services, where 
Mason J indicated the desirability of maintaining the parens patriae 
jurisdiction.71 The qualification in each statute’s offence provisions that 
transplant procedures may take place where otherwise ‘authorised by law’,72 
would seem enough to maintain the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court in the majority of jurisdictions (although perhaps not in South Australia, 
                                                 
66  The continued existence of the parens patriae jurisdiction in parallel to the federal jurisdiction under the 
FL Act has been doubted because of the inclusion in the latter legislation of section 69B. This is 
considered further in Part II(D)(2), below, in the analysis of the High Court’s decision in P v P (1994) 
181 CLR 583. 
67  John Seymour, ‘Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their Nature and Origins’ (1994) 14 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 159. See also AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 189 (Gaudron J) citing Re X (a 
minor) [1975] Fam 47, 50–1 (Latey J). 
68  The general parens patriae jurisdiction was inherited by the Supreme Courts from the UK Courts of 
Equity. See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 70; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 85; Supreme Court 
Act 1935 (SA) s 17(2)(a)(i); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 16(1)(d). The Supreme Court Act 1867 
(Qld) and Equity Act 1867 (Qld) are cited in Carseldine v Director of the Department of Children’s 
Services (1974) 133 CLR 345, 363 (Mason J) as establishing the parens patriae jurisdiction in 
Queensland. 
69  This can be contrasted with legislation which expressly states that it does not limit the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.  See, eg, Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) s 247. 
70  (1964) 113 CLR 411, 419 (Barwick CJ). 
71  (1974) 133 CLR 345, 366 (Mason J); see also Johnson v Director-General of Social Welfare (Vic) (1976) 
135 CLR 92, 97 (Barwick CJ), 100 (Murphy J); K v Minister for Youth and Community Services [1982] 1 
NSWLR 311, 323 (Helsham CJ in Eq). 
72  Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 48(5)(b); Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 36(4)(c); 
Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979 (NT) s 27(3)(b); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld)  
 s 48(3)(b); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 38(3)(c); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas)  
 s 30(4)(b); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 44(5)(b); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) 
 s 33(3)(c). 
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Victoria or Western Australia).73 Therefore, legislative prohibitions or regulation 
of tissue transplantations from young children may be circumvented if an 
appropriate order is given by the Supreme Court.74  
 
(b) Exercise of the Parens Patriae Jurisdiction 
In exercising parens patriae jurisdiction, the court must take the general 
welfare of the child as the paramount consideration. This requires the court to 
deliberate on a broader range of factors than those identified in the statutory 
regimes.75 The court will only exercise this jurisdiction with caution, and as well 
as expert evidence placed before the court, it will take into account the views and 
wishes of the parents and the child the subject of the proceedings.76 It is clear that 
the court, in exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction, will consider the wishes of 
the child as an important factor, although not a determinative one, in making a 
decision.77  
This approach is given further weight when article 12 of the CRC is 
considered.78 The Supreme Court of NSW in Re Thomas has indicated that the 
Convention, while not incorporated into domestic law, ‘has relevance to 
decisions made in respect of children by administrative and judicial decision-
makers’.79 
                                                 
73  There is an argument that in South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the existence of an express 
prohibition which makes the removal of tissue from children unlawful: see, eg, Transplantation and 
Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 12(b); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 14(2); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 
1982 (WA) s 12(1) which may affect the Supreme Court’s power to make an order in the parens patriae 
jurisdiction. Some cases have limited the exercise of the jurisdiction to circumstances that are ‘lawful’: 
see, eg, statements in Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562, 565 (Wilson J); Y v Austin Health (2005) 13 
VR 363, 368, 372 (Habersberger J); Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454, 456, 460 (Chesterman J); or 
where no statutory prohibition exists that is contrary to the order requested: Re Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 
595, 598 (Atkinson J). If this alternative argument succeeded, then in South Australia, Victoria and 
Western Australia, Sandra and Frank would have to apply to the Family Court to circumvent the State 
statutory provisions. 
74  See, eg, the comments of Hargrave J in AB v Attorney-General (Vic) (2005) 12 VR 485, 505 (although in 
a slightly different context). It was also recognised that a Supreme Court, although possessing 
jurisdiction, may choose not to provide such authorisation in light of the statutory regime: at 504. 
75  A court in considering the best interests of a potential vulnerable donor is likely to consider the current 
and future relationships of the donor and the recipient (which may be particularly relevant in Tina’s 
situation given that Tina and her brother have not lived together for some time), the effect on the donor if 
the procedure does not go ahead, compared with if it goes ahead, the risks involved and the views of the 
donor. See, eg, Northern Sydney and Central Coast Area Health Service v CT (by his tutor ET) [2005] 
NSWSC 551 (10 June 2005) [26]–[29] (Nicholas J); Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 552–3 [36]–[43], 
284–5 (Cronin J); Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421, 428–9 (Hannon J). Note that in the last two cases, the 
Family Court was exercising federal jurisdiction under the FL Act, however, as discussed in Part II(C)(1), 
this jurisdiction is similar to the parens patriae jurisdiction. Cf Part II(B)(1)(c), below. 
76  See, eg, Director-General, Department of Community Services; Re Thomas (2009) 41 Fam LR 220, 229–
30, 232 (Brereton J) (‘Re Thomas’); Minister for Health v AS (2004) 29 WAR 517, 226–7 [8]–[15], 228 
[23] (Pullin J); Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children v J (2005) 33 Fam LR 448, 451–6 (Einstein J). 
77  See, eg, above n 65 and the cases cited. 
78  See above Part II(B)(1)(c); see also CRC art 12. 
79  (2009) 41 Fam LR 220, 232–3 (Brereton J). See also Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. 
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Related to the question of whether a child’s views will be considered by a 
court is whether a potential child donor will be separately represented during 
proceedings.80 This depends on individual jurisdictions’ court rules, how the 
matter is brought before the court and the discretion of the judge hearing the 
application.81 For example, where the child is included as a party (whether 
applicant or respondent), it may be necessary to have a litigation guardian or 
tutor appointed pursuant to court rules.82 Normally, a parent can act in this 
position; however, arguably in the situation of tissue transplantation, if the 
recipient of the tissue is also close to the parent, there may be a conflict of 
interest that may result in their unsuitability for this position.83 Geoff Monahan 
suggests that the common law recognises that a litigation guardian or tutor should 
act in the best interests of the child.84 Alternatively, in some circumstances, a 
court may ask counsel to appear amicus curiae. This appears especially likely in 
cases where there is no contradictor to an application.85 However, the role of an 
amicus is quite different from that of a litigation guardian (or an independent 
children’s lawyer under the FL Act) as their duty will be to the court and not to 
the individual child.86 
Arguably then, given there is no physical benefit received by the child who 
has tissue removed (and the psychological benefit remains open to debate), if a 
child strongly objects to the procedure, a Supreme Court exercising its parens 
patriae jurisdiction would be unlikely to find that authorising such a procedure 
would be in the best interests of the child. When this is coupled with the fact that 
an application to the court, in itself, offers a procedural safeguard and third party 
oversight, it is clear that this process offers substantially more protection for 
                                                 
80  See also CRC art 12(2), which provides: ‘For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, 
or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law.’ 
81  Cf the position under the FL Act, discussed in more depth below in Part(II)(C)(1). 
82  See, eg, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 93–8 (a person under a legal capacity is defined in 
sch 2 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) as including a person under 18 years of age); 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 7.13–18. In relation to NSW, see comments in Royal 
Alexandra Hospital for Children v J (2005) 33 Fam LR 448, 450 (Einstein J) referring to provisions 
which are now contained in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 7.13–18.  
83  See Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 94(1)(b); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 
7.15(2)(c). Cf Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562, where a public hospital sought authorisation for 
termination of the pregnancy of a 12 year old girl. In this case, the Supreme Court accepted the girl’s 
father as her litigation guardian despite the Court recognising that her parents may act in accordance with 
conflicting interests that favour the family as a whole rather than just B: at 565. Justice Wilson in that 
case appointed counsel as amicus curiae to act as contradictor: at 566–7.  
84  Geoff Monahan, ‘Autonomy vs Beneficence: Ethics and the Representation of Children and Young 
People in Legal Proceedings’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 
392, 396. 
85  Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562, 566–7 (Wilson J). 
86  Bropho v Tickner (1993) 40 FCR 165, 172 (Wilcox J): ‘the amicus’ role [is] normally ... confined to 
assisting the court in its task of resolving the issues tendered by the parties by drawing attention to some 
aspect of the case which might otherwise be overlooked’.  
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young children. This is particularly true when compared with the position under 
some statutory regimes.  
 
C Introducing the Federal Regime 
The federated structure of the Australian legal system, consisting of a 
complicated series of overlapping and at times inconsistent state, territory and 
federal law means the legal position regarding tissue transplantation procedures 
is even more complex. An order authorising such a procedure under the federal 
jurisdiction of the FL Act can circumvent state and territory legislation regulating 
or prohibiting these procedures, as well as the parens patriae jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. 
The Family Court did not inherit the general parens patriae jurisdiction and 
is therefore limited to the statutory jurisdiction conferred by the FL Act (and 
other legislation).87 Jurisdiction over the welfare of children – which would cover 
the regulation of medical procedures – is not an area that is directly within the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament.88 However, jurisdiction has 
been conferred on the Family Court regarding the welfare of children using some 
other heads of Commonwealth power in Part VII of the FL Act.89 A brief outline 
of this jurisdiction in relation to the welfare of the child is required: its structure 
demonstrates the restrictions caused by the constitutional basis on which the Act 
is founded. 
 
                                                 
87  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 254–5 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). A wider 
jurisdiction that had been conferred on the Family Court pursuant to the original cross-vesting scheme 
was held invalid in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. The cross-vesting scheme had 
vested the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the Family Court. However, in Wakim, the 
High Court held that this was invalid as it purported to vest State judicial power in a federal court. 
Chapter III of the Constitution permitted only the conferral of federal judicial power on federal courts. 
88  Pursuant to Constitution ss 51–2. 
89  The Commonwealth Parliament has also been able to confer more general jurisdiction on the Family 
Court (not limited to children of a marriage) through State referral of powers pursuant to s 51(xxxvii) of 
the Constitution, in the areas of maintenance, custody, guardianship, access and parentage: see 
Commonwealth Powers (Family Law – Children) Act 1986 (NSW); Commonwealth Powers (Family 
Law) Act 1986 (SA); Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Act 1987 (Tas); Commonwealth Powers 
(Family Law) Act 1986 (Vic); Commonwealth Powers (Family Law – Children) Act 1990 (Qld) s 3(1). 
Notably absent from these referrals is any reference to the welfare of the child. The High Court has 
confirmed that these references are narrower than a general welfare jurisdiction, which means that the 
welfare jurisdiction over children of a marriage is not expanded by these State referrals: see Marion’s 
Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 255 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 219 CLR 365, 387 (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J), 405 
(Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 435, 439 (Callinan J) (‘MIMIA v B’). The jurisdiction of the Family 
Court under the FL Act is also vested in the State Supreme Courts: Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) 
Act 1987 (Cth) s 5. This has been relied upon, for example, in Director-General, Department of 
Community Services; Re Jules (2008) 40 Fam LR 122, 125–6 (Brereton J), where the Court was uncertain 
as to whether the Supreme Court parens patriae jurisdiction existed concurrently with the FL Act 
jurisdiction. 
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1 Section 67ZC: A Limited Welfare Jurisdiction 
Section 67ZC of the FL Act is the most important provision for the purposes 
of this article. It creates jurisdiction to ‘make orders relating to the welfare of 
children’.90 In making any such order, the court must regard the best interests of 
the child as the paramount consideration.91 The principle of ‘best interests of the 
child’ is further explained in the Act,92 and the factors that are relevant to its 
determination are very similar to the considerations taken into account by the 
Supreme Courts under the parens patriae jurisdiction. In fact, the majority in 
Marion’s Case said the jurisdiction is ‘similar to the parens patriae 
jurisdiction’.93 The court must consider, inter alia, ‘any views expressed by the 
child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that 
the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views’,94 
and ‘any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant’.95 
The FL Act also makes provision for the appointment of Independent 
Children’s Lawyers at the discretion of the court.96 The role of such lawyers is to 
form an independent view of what is in the best interests of the child and, 
although they are not obliged to act on the child’s instructions, they must ‘ensure 
that any views expressed by the child in relation to the matters to which the 
                                                 
90  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 67ZC(1). 
91  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 67ZC(2). See, eg, Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 290–1 (Cronin J); Re W 
(1997) 136 FLR 421, 428–9 (Hannon J). 
92  See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) pt VII div 1 sub-div BA, particularly ss 60B, 60CC. Although, since the 
amendments incorporated by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 
(Cth), the focus has been on taking into account the need for both parents to be involved in a child’s life, 
the factors identified are also relevant to welfare orders regarding medical treatment made by the Family 
Court: see Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 67ZC(2). 
93  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 258 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); see also P v P 
(1994) 181 CLR 583, 598–9 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
94  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC(3)(a). 
95  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60 CC(3)(m). In the context of authorising sterilisation of a child without 
capacity, Nicholson CJ set out a number of other factors that will be relevant to determining the best 
interests of the child: Re Marion (No 2) (1992) 17 Fam LR 336, 351. The factors were the particular 
condition of the child which requires the procedure or treatment; the nature of the procedure or treatment 
proposed; the reasons for which it is proposed that the procedure or treatment be carried out; the 
alternative courses of treatment that are available in relation to that condition; the desirability of and 
effect of authorising the procedure or treatment proposed rather than the available alternatives; the 
physical effects on the child and the psychological and social implications for the child of (a) authorising 
the proposed procedure or treatment and (b) not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment; the 
nature and degree of any risk to the child of: (a) authorising the proposed procedure or treatment and (b) 
not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment; the views (if any) expressed by (a) the guardian(s) 
of the child; a person who is entitled to the custody of the child; a person who is responsible for the daily 
care and control of the child; and the child to the proposed procedure or treatment and to any alternative 
procedure or treatment. These factors have also been applied by the courts in the context of tissue 
transplantation procedures: Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421, 428–9 (Hannon J). See also Re Inaya (2007) 213 
FLR 278, 291 (Cronin J). Although note that in Re W the Court thought that the only relevant factors 
from Chief Justice Nicholson’s list were the nature of the procedure or treatment proposed and the 
physical effects on the child and the psychological and social implications for the child were relevant to 
the situation of a bone marrow transplant: at 428–9 (Hannon J). 
96  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 68L. See, eg, Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 281 (Cronin J). 
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proceedings relate are fully put before the court’.97 If such a lawyer is appointed, 
there is a far greater chance that the child’s views will be made known and 
therefore taken into account.98 
 
2 Constitutionality of section 67ZC and Chapter III of the Constitution  
Marion’s Case considered the constitutionality of the welfare jurisdiction 
under the FL Act.99 The jurisdiction of the Court was challenged on the basis that 
the conferral of the power on the Family Court to authorise a sterilisation 
procedure for a child of a marriage was not ‘federal judicial power’ and therefore 
could not be conferred on a federal court.100 It was argued the power was not 
federal judicial power because it did not involve a ‘matter’ – that is, there was no 
controversy over an ‘immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the 
determination of the Court’.101 The High Court determined that the welfare 
jurisdiction in circumstances where the parents applied for an order authorising a 
sterilisation procedure involved a ‘matter’ and therefore was federal judicial 
power.102 The ‘matter’ in Marion’s Case stemmed from the controversy over 
parental obligations to care for the child created by the Act.103 This was 
subsequently considered and further explained by the High Court in MIMIA v 
B.104 Chief Justice Gleeson and McHugh J explained that the ‘welfare of 
children’ itself was not a ‘matter’;105 rather the matter arose from the controversy 
                                                 
97  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 68LA(2)(a), (4)(b), 5(b). See also, National Legal Aid, Guidelines for 
Independent Children’s Lawyers (6 December 2007) 
<http://www.nla.aust.net.au/res/File/PDFs/ICL%20guidelines-6-12-07.pdf>. 
98  See Monahan, above n 84, 398–400. 
99  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218 considered Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 63, 64. These sections 
were inserted by the Family Law Amendment Act 1983 (Cth) and were replaced as s 67ZC in substantially 
the same form by the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
100  As such, it would be inconsistent with Chapter III of the Constitution, and more specifically the second 
limb of the Boilermaker’s doctrine: R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 
CLR 254 (‘Boilermakers’ Case’), which prohibits the conferral of anything other than federal judicial 
power on federal Chapter III Courts, such as the Family Court. 
101  Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and 
Starke JJ). 
102  Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 257 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
103  See, eg Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 63E as it then was: MIMIA v B (2004) 219 CLR 365, 381 (Gleeson 
CJ and McHugh J). In MIMIA v B, an order was sought against a third party, but the Court held that no 
‘matter’ existed; there was no conflicting right or obligation, because the Act did not create rights or 
obligations on third parties: at 390–1 (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). The joint judgment of Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ found that the power of the Family Court under s 69ZH was similarly limited to 
parental responsibilities under the legislation and did not extend to matters involving third parties: at 396, 
405 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). See also 434–9 (Callinan J). 
104  (2004) 219 CLR 365. 
105  Ibid 379 (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). 
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over the statutory obligations in the Act. Thus, the welfare jurisdiction in section 
67ZC is only as broad as the obligations that arise under the FL Act.106  
 
3 Section 67ZC: Legislative Power and Breadth 
At first glance, section 67ZC appears to provide a broad jurisdiction to make 
welfare orders for the best interests of a child. The confusion that exists around 
the breadth of section 67ZC arises because of the difficult drafting of the FL Act 
and its reliance upon a patchwork of federal legislative powers – the marriage 
power, the referral power and the territories power.107 Section 67ZC must be read 
against sections 69ZH, 69ZE,108 69ZG and 69ZJ. The effect of these provisions 
is that with two exceptions, each reference to a child in the welfare jurisdiction is 
confined to a child of a marriage.109 The exceptions are where the child is 
situated in a Territory,110 or where the child’s parents reside in different states.111 
 
D The State and Federal Regimes and Section 109 
At the federal level then, the FL Act provides jurisdiction to make orders for 
the welfare of a child of a marriage, a child in a territory, or where the child has 
parents residing in different states. State legislation and the common law provide 
the legal framework for issues regarding the tissue transplantation for children 
who do not fall within the jurisdiction under the FL Act. However, the state 
legislation is drafted in a more general form than this, as it applies to all children 
within that jurisdiction, as does the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. Therefore, more than one of the different regimes may purport to apply to 
                                                 
106  Cf T v F (1999) 151 FLR 312, 335 (Nicholson CJ, Lindenmayer and Kay JJ), which seems to imply a 
broader ‘welfare jurisdiction’ may be found in s 68B, which gives the power to the Court to order 
injunctions as it considers appropriate for the welfare of the child. It is doubtful after MIMIA v B that this 
jurisdiction would be as broad as the earlier decision finds, but it would also be limited to where there are 
rights and obligations in issue under the remaining provisions of the FL Act. 
107  When trying to determine the breadth of s 67ZC, Gleeson CJ and McHugh J have commented in MIMIA v 
B (2004) 219 CLR 365, 375, that ‘[t]he principal difficulty in the appeal arises out of the complexity of 
the legislative scheme contained in Pt VII … dealing with children, a complexity that is not reduced by a 
form of drafting that is sometimes used in federal legislation. This form of drafting commences with the 
enactment of a provision that, standing alone, suggests an absence of constitutional constraints on the 
Federal Parliament. Other sections of the legislation, however, then operate to confine the primary 
provision and bring its content within one or more heads of federal constitutional power’. 
108  This section extends the jurisdiction over children in Part VII insofar as there is a reference to the 
Commonwealth from the States. These references do not extend to the welfare of children, and therefore 
are not relevant for the purposes of this article. See above n 89. 
109  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZH(2)(a). Section 60F defines a ‘child of a marriage’ to include adopted 
children, children born prior to the marriage, children born as a result of artificial conception procedures 
and surrogacy arrangements. It also includes a child of a marriage that has ended (by divorce, annulment 
or death). Finally, s 60E provides that the Part applies to void marriages as if the marriage were valid. 
110  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZG; the Commonwealth Parliament has plenary power over Territories 
pursuant to s 122 of the Constitution. 
111  See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZJ, and its application in Re Brodie (Special Medical Procedures: 
Jurisdiction) [2007] FamCA 776 (24 July 2007) [42]–[43] (Carter J). The federal power over this area 
comes from the jurisdiction granted in s 75(iv) of the Constitution. 
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a single situation. This raises the question as to whether the regimes are 
inconsistent. 
Inconsistency appears to arise in a number of circumstances, including 
where: 
a) a state regime for regenerative tissue prohibits the taking of tissue from a 
young child but there is a court decision made under the FL Act 
authorising the procedure;112 
b) a state regime for regenerative tissue allows the taking of tissue from a 
young child when certain conditions are met, those conditions are not 
met but there is a court decision made under the FL Act authorising the 
procedure; 
c) the state regime for regenerative tissue allows the taking of tissue from a 
young child when certain conditions are met, those conditions are met 
but there is a court decision made under the FL Act refusing to authorise 
the procedure; 
d) there has been an unsuccessful application in the state Supreme Court’s 
parens patriae jurisdiction for authorisation to undertake the procedure 
but there is a court decision made under the FL Act authorising the 
procedure; or 
e) there has been a successful application in the state Supreme Court’s 
parens patriae jurisdiction for authorisation to undertake the procedure 
but there is a court decision made under the FL Act refusing to authorise 
the procedure.113 
Section 109 of the Constitution provides that where there is any 
inconsistency between federal and state law, the federal law prevails. The High 
Court has developed a number of tests to determine whether constitutional 
inconsistency exists. 
 
1 Inconsistency Tests 
The initial test for inconsistency developed by the High Court was whether a 
person can obey both ‘laws’ simultaneously.114 In a situation where there may be 
conflicting court orders, or a conflict between a court order and a statutory 
scheme, it may seem prima facie that such obedience is not possible. However, 
orders under the FL Act will generally authorise but not require medical 
                                                 
112  Whilst not ‘laws’, decisions such as orders and awards made pursuant to legislation have been regularly 
considered by the High Court as actively engaging s 109: Commonwealth v New South Wales (1923) 33 
CLR 1, 27 (Knox CJ and Starke J), 54–5 (Isaacs J), on the basis that the inconsistency arises with the 
legislation authorising the action: Metal Trades Industry Association of Australia v Amalgamated Metal 
Workers’ and Shipwrights’ Union (1983) 152 CLR 632, 648 (Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ). 
113  Options (d) and (e) are unlikely to occur due to the operation of Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69B 
(previously s 63A), discussed at more length below at Part II(D)(2). 
114  See, eg, R v Brisbane Licensing Court; Ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 CLR 23; Australian Boot Trade 
Employees Federation v Whybrow (1910) 10 CLR 266. 
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procedures to be carried out,115 or refuse to authorise such procedures, rather 
than prohibit them outright.116 Therefore, simultaneous obedience is possible. 
Where a Commonwealth law permits an act without requiring it and the state 
law prevents or regulates it,117 there may still be inconsistency. The court will 
consider whether the federal law, correctly construed, intended the action to be 
able to be performed without concurrent or supplementary regulation by the 
states, or whether it intended the action to be able to be performed subject to any 
applicable state law.118 In the context of the FL Act, this question was considered 
by the High Court in P v P.119 
 
2 P v P  
P v P concerned a question of inconsistency between a Family Court order 
authorising a sterilisation procedure and the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), 
which regulated the grounds on which such a procedure could be conducted, 
including requiring the consent of the Guardianship Board. The child in question 
was the child of married parents who had subsequently divorced. Both parents 
supported the application for a sterilisation procedure in the Family Court;120 
                                                 
115  Generally, the Supreme Court in the exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction will make an order 
authorising a procedure, which can, for example, be used by a medical practitioner in lieu of the consent 
of the parents. In rare cases the Supreme Court has made orders requiring a procedure to be carried out: 
See, eg, DoSC v Y [1999] NSWSC 644 (7 July 1999) [3], [121] (Austin J). 
116  Generally, the Supreme Court in the exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction will refuse to make an 
order as requested. However, in limited cases the Court has issued an injunction, for example, to stop a 
HIV positive mother from breastfeeding her child: Re Baby A [1999] NSWSC 787 (26 July 1999) (Young 
J).  
117  Although it is also likely that such an inconsistency will arise if a state permission is modified or 
regulated by a federal law: see Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Grappling with Inconsistency between Commonwealth 
and State Legislation and the Link with Statutory Interpretation’ (2005) 8 Constitutional Law and Policy 
Review 25, 28. 
118  Australian Mutual Provident Society v Goulden (1986) 160 CLR 330, 339. An inconsistency may arise on 
the basis that a law has modified rights, privileges or liabilities conferred by the federal law: See, eg, 
Colvin v Bradley Brothers Pty Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 151; O’Sullivan v Noarlunga Meat Ltd (No 1) (1954) 
92 CLR 565, 591, 593 (Fullagar J); R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte 
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 222–3; cf the decisions in Commercial Radio 
Coffs Harbour v Fuller (1986) 161 CLR 47; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) v Wardley (1980) 
142 CLR 237; or the state law is impermissibly encroaching onto a legislative area that was intended to 
be regulated exhaustively by the Commonwealth (the ‘covering the field’ inconsistency test: first 
established in Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466, 489 (Isaacs J); Ex parte 
McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472, 483 (Dixon J)). There is some academic debate as to the correct 
classification of the inconsistency tests: see, eg, Allan Murray-Jones, ‘The Tests for Inconsistency under 
Section 109 of the Constitution’ (1979) 10 Federal Law Review 25; Gary A Rumble, ‘The Nature of 
Inconsistency under Section 109 of the Constitution’ (1980) 11 Federal Law Review 40; Peter Hanks, 
‘“Inconsistent” Commonwealth and State Laws: Centralizing Government Power in the Australian 
Federation’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 107; Lindell, above n 117. There is some overlap in the 
application of these two tests. As said above, the crucial question in determining whether either test has 
been met lies in whether the Commonwealth intended the court exercising federal jurisdiction to make 
orders exclusive of any other jurisdiction, or whether the power was intended to operate cumulatively 
upon the State legislation and common law in the area. 
119  P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583. 
120  Ibid 591 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
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neither parent intended to apply to the Guardianship Board under the 
Guardianship Act.121 
The joint majority of the Court found the Family Court’s jurisdiction was not 
subject to the Guardianship Act, because of an inconsistency between the two 
schemes.122 The Court found ‘operational inconsistency’ only.123 This meant that 
the conferral of jurisdiction by the FL Act did not permanently invalidate the 
entire Guardianship Act (or remove the parens patriae jurisdiction of the NSW 
Supreme Court).124 However, where there was a valid order of the Family Court 
authorising the procedure, the Guardianship Act was invalid insofar as it 
operated to prevent or regulate such an authorisation.125  
This outcome was not without controversy. The majority decision is contrary 
to Mason J’s earlier view that the Supreme Court lost any jurisdiction that had 
been vested in the Family Court.126 This earlier judgment was not referred to in 
the majority’s reasoning. Other cases and commentary have drawn upon the 
existence of section 69B (previously section 63A) of the FL Act to support the 
conclusion that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction has been more generally 
ousted.127 This provision states that proceedings that may be instituted under Part 
VII of the Act may not be instituted otherwise. Perplexingly, the majority in P v 
P also did not refer to section 63A in its reasoning.128 Queen’s Counsel David 
Jackson in his argument for the applicant indicated that section 63A operated to 
preclude instituting state proceedings (even in the Guardianship Tribunal), but 
only where proceedings had been ‘properly brought under Part VII’.129 Although 
not expressed in the judgment, this interpretation of section 63A is most 
consistent with the majority’s decision. 
 
                                                 
121  Ibid 592 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
122  Ibid 606 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). See also McHugh J at 635–6; cf the decision in 
Dunne v P (2004) 29 WAR 232, 437 [96], 439 [107], [109] (Malcolm CJ), 450 [173] (McLure J), in 
which the Court found that the FL Act jurisdiction was intended to be subjected to State laws such as the 
Bail Act. 
123  For a further explanation of ‘operational inconsistency’, see: Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 
618, 631 (Dixon J) and Commonwealth v Western Australia (1999) 196 CLR 392, 416 (Gleeson CJ and 
Gaudron J). 
124  P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583, 604, 606 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
125  Ibid 603 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
126  Fountain v Alexander (1982) 150 CLR 615, 636 (Mason J). This is consistent with the second reading 
speech for the relevant legislation: ‘Although the relevant amendments in the Bill will prevent the State 
Supreme Courts from exercising ward of court powers in proceedings concerning a child of a marriage 
and involving a party to the marriage, I would stress that the Commonwealth does not propose to intrude 
into the area that is commonly termed State child welfare law’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 1 June 1983, 1097 (Gareth Evans) (emphasis added). 
127  John Seymour, ‘The Role of the Family Court of Australia in Child Welfare Matters’ (1992) 21 Federal 
Law Review 1, 23. See also Mulhall v Hartnell (1988) 91 FLR 240, 240 (Young J); Young v Lalic (2006) 
197 FLR 27, 36–9 (Brereton J); Re Jules (2008) 40 Fam LR 122, 125–6 (Brereton J). 
128  McHugh J did consider s 63A, finding that it rendered invalid any part of the State legislation that 
purported to confer jurisdiction over welfare of a child of a marriage on a Court but not a tribunal. This 
turned on the use of the word ‘proceedings’: P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583, 632–3 (McHugh J). 
129  Ibid 589 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
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3 Subsequent Consideration 
The majority position in P v P has subsequently been applied in a number of 
Family Court decisions.130 Most recently, Cronin J considered P v P in Re Inaya, 
in the context of a potential inconsistency between a prohibition on a bone 
marrow transplantation from a young child under the Human Tissue Act 1982 
(Vic) and Part VII of the FL Act. He commenced with broad statements about the 
inconsistency between the Human Tissue Act and the Family Court Act, which 
seemed to support a conclusion that there was a general inconsistency. However, 
his final conclusion was not so sweeping, noting that the inconsistency only 
eventuated where there was an inconsistent Family Court order – that is, an 
operational inconsistency.131 
The result in P v P and its subsequent application has caused some 
confusion.132 Ian Freckelton has asserted that ‘any State legislation which 
narrows the circumstances in which sterilisation procedures may be authorised by 
prescribing more restrictive criteria than those established by Re Marion will be 
invalid.’133 Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart have said ‘Re 
Inaya has effectively rendered the State based legislative restrictions on parental 
consent to donation of regenerative tissue void.’134 Others have asserted that state 
legislation is invalid where it authorises procedures that fall within the FL Act, 
that is, the state creates an alternative method of authorisation.135 
These conclusions sit in contradiction with the statements in P v P that, for 
example: ‘the intent of Parliament … was that both jurisdictions should exist 
concurrently’,136 and that ‘[a]s a practical matter, ... invalidity will only be 
significant in a case where the Family Court exercises its jurisdiction to authorise 
particular medical treatment and then only in respect of that treatment.’137 
Essentially, this allows state regimes and the parens patriae jurisdiction to be 
circumvented if an order authorising the prohibited procedure is obtained under 
the FL Act. However, it does not invalidate the alternative procedure in the 
absence of such authorisation.138 Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix A illustrate the 
position. 
 
                                                 
130  See, eg, JLS v JES (1996) 20 Fam LR 485, 488–9 (Bryson J); Docs v Y [1999] NSWSC 644 (7 July 1999) 
[90]–[97] (Austin J). 
131  Re Inaya (2007) 213 FLR 278, 290 (Cronin J). 
132  See, eg, Freckelton, above n 3, 303–4; Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and 
Law for the Health Professionals (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 492; Tait, Carney and Deane, above n 3, 
141–2, contra at 164–5; William J Keough, ‘Authority to Treat: A Comparative Look at the Jurisdiction, 
Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Children’s Court of Victoria and Family Court 
of Australia in Medical Matters’ (2003) 10 Journal of Law and Medicine 442, 454; Bailey-Harris, above 
n 44, 15–6. 
133  Freckelton, above n 3, 303. 
134  Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 132, 610. 
135  Bailey-Harris, above n 44, 15–6. See also Tait, Carney and Deane, above n 3, 141–2, contra at 164–5. 
136  P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583, 604 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
137  Ibid 606 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
138  See, eg, discussion of the case in Queensland Law Reform Commission, Consent to Health Care of 
Young People, Report No 51 (1996) vol 1, 97–9. 
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E Analysis: Tina’s Position 
Returning to Tina’s case, uncertainties exist regarding the correct forum for 
seeking authorisation of these types of procedures.139  If living in NSW and 
Queensland, Frank or Sandra could, with the certification of multiple medical 
practitioners, consent to regenerative tissue (including liver tissue) being 
removed for transplantation into Nathan, where there is ‘minimal risk’ to Tina, 
subject to that consent remaining effective. However, if resident in Victoria, 
Frank or Sandra could consent to such removal of regenerative tissue from Tina 
if only one medical practitioner has provided certification, subject to that consent 
remaining effective. In most, if not all, Australian jurisdictions,140 Frank and 
Sandra may be able to seek an order of the Supreme Court to authorise the 
procedure under the common law parens patriae jurisdiction, in which the court 
must consider the best interests of the child as paramount. In all jurisdictions 
apart from Western Australia,141 if Frank and Sandra did not wish to comply with 
the above outlined regimes, or they sought to circumvent such regimes, they 
could apply under the FL Act (generally to the Family Court) for an order 
authorising the procedure.142 Under the FL Act, a Children’s Independent Lawyer 
is likely to be appointed to expressly consider Tina’s best interests and advocate 
for the child. The court would apply the statutory ‘best interests’ test in 
determining whether to authorise the procedure or not. However, if Frank and 
Sandra were not and had never been married, the Family Court would not have 
jurisdiction to give orders under the FL Act unless they were resident in a 
territory, or they were resident in different states.  
As a consequence of this maze of regimes, Tina’s position is uncertain: 
different outcomes depend on her place of residence, the forum in which her 
parents seek authorisation, and even her parents’ marital status. Not only is this 
unsatisfactory for the child involved, but it leaves the medical practitioners who 
tread a fine line between acting within and outside the law, and the parents in a 
difficult position. All are required to navigate legal complexities while under 
significant time pressure and other stresses. Doubt about the constitutional 
validity of state regimes authorising procedures – that are also within the 
jurisdiction of the FL Act – also leaves Tina, her parents and medical 
practitioners in the centre of a constitutional maelstrom.143 
 
                                                 
139  See, NSWLRC, Minor’s Consent, above n 45, [4.27]; Belinda Bennett, ‘Symbiotic Relationships: Saviour 
Siblings, Family Rights and Biomedicine’ (2005) 19 Australian Journal of Family Law 195, 209–10.  
140  See discussion at above n 73. 
141  In Western Australia, the position is similar to (d), but the application would be made to the Family Court 
of Western Australia, not the Family Court. See Family Court Act 1997 (WA) s 162(1), which confers 
jurisdiction on the Family Court of Western Australia over welfare. 
142  This will turn on whether such a procedure is found to be within parental authority. See the discussion of 
the relevant authorities and considerations in Part II(A) above. 
143  Australian Constitution s 109; see also discussion of the differing views in Part II(D) above. 
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F Ethical Guidelines 
So far we have attempted to elucidate the legal position of a young child who 
is being viewed as a potential tissue donor. We are unable to comment as to 
whether the legal position reflects the reality of medical practice in Australia.144  
Many international policies and guidelines emphasise that tissue removal 
from those without capacity should only occur in exceptional circumstances.145 
Preconditions to removal of tissue are specified in these documents that are often 
not reflected in domestic laws.146 Given that young children are most often used 
as donors because they are compatible with a relative, ethically it is recognised 
that an unavoidable conflict of interests arises. This is particularly true for 
parents who may view one child as a donor and one as a sick child in need of 
tissue.147 Therefore, some guidelines have advocated conducting a variety of 
medical, psychological, ethical and legal assessments, the use of a donor 
advocate, consideration by an independent committee separate from the 
transplant team, and ongoing donor support post-transplant.148 
It is not unreasonable to assume that such policies and guidelines will 
influence those health care professionals who carry out such procedures on 
children like Tina. In Australia we have the Organ and Tissue Donation by 
Living Donors – Guidelines for Ethical Practice for Health Professionals 
compiled by the National Health and Medical Research Council.149 Those 
guidelines recommend compliance with far more stringent procedural 
requirements prior to transplantation from children than those statutory regimes 
discussed above.150 Unfortunately, no empirical study has been undertaken from 
which to draw conclusions as to whether medical practitioners may be complying 
with these guidelines rather than utilising the law to its fullest extent.151 
                                                 
144  Previous studies in the US have shown that despite the legal position allowing organ transplantation from 
children, many practitioners and medical centres have a policy that does not allow such procedures to 
take place: see Aaron Spital, ‘Should Children Ever Donate Kidneys?: Views of US Transplant Centers’ 
(1997) 64 Transplantation 232; See also Mason and Laurie, above n 37, for the position in the UK.  
145  See, eg, Additional Protocol to the CHRB, above n 60 art 14; World Health Organization Executive 
Board, above n 19; World Medical Association, Statement on Human Donation and Transplantation 
(2006) art 23.  
146  Ibid. 
147  See, eg, Dwyer and Vig, above n 13, 9–10; Lynn A Jansen, ‘Child Organ Donation, Family Autonomy, 
and Intimate Attachments’ (2004) 13 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 133, 135; Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995) 46 [6.25]; National Health and 
Medical Research Council, Organ and Tissue Donation by Living Donors: Guidelines for Ethical 
Practice for Health Professionals (2007) 26; World Health Organization Executive Board, above n 19.  
148  See, eg, National Health and Medical Research Council, above n 147, 25–7, 33–44; World Medical 
Association, above n 145; Additional Protocol to the CHRB, above n 60, art 14. 
149  National Health and Medical Research Council, above n 147. 
150  Ibid. 
151  For example, regardless of the ambiguity of the effect of a child’s objection in some statutory regimes, 
some medical professionals may not proceed where a child objects if they see it to be incompatible with 
their professional medical ethics.  
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However, these ethical guidelines have no legal force.152 There is, therefore, no 
legal compulsion on those involved in transplants to follow these requirements 
strictly or at all. 
The newly established Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and 
Transplantation Authority (‘AOTDTA’) can also introduce policies in this 
area.153 The CEO of the AOTDTA is able to formulate ‘policies and protocols 
relating to organ or tissue donation and transplantation matters’.154 This includes 
any policy or protocol developed in relation to transplantation of tissue from 
young children.155 AOTDTA recognises that there are a number of issues with 
respect to inconsistency of legislation nationally and has said it will consider 
these issues as part of the process of establishing a nationally coordinated and 
consistent approach to tissue donation.156 However, any policies produced by the 
AOTDTA will also rely upon voluntary compliance.157 
 
III CONCLUSIONS: AUSTRALIA, TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 
AND THE ‘BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD’ 
A The Current Regimes: Inconsistencies and Overlap 
The current unsatisfactory position is the result of a complex overlay of 
jurisdictions conferred by state and territory legislation, the parens patriae 
jurisdiction possessed by the Supreme Courts, and the federal jurisdiction. 
The existence of different standards and forums regarding medical 
procedures such as tissue transplantation from a young child has a number of 
concerning consequences. Within Australia, young children may be subjected to 
different tests as to when such procedures may be undertaken, based on their (or 
their parents’) residency, or the legal status of their parents’ relationship. There is 
uncertainty regarding the constitutional validity of state forums (that is, the 
statutory regimes and/or the Supreme Court) to authorise such procedures, as the 
operation of the section 109 inconsistency test on such schemes is not beyond 
doubt. This leaves parents and medical practitioners potentially open to 
prosecution if acting pursuant to an invalid regime.158 In some jurisdictions, 
considerations that are held to be important aspects of assessing the ‘best 
interests of the child’ under international and common law are not relevant, 
including consideration of the child’s views. Further, an independent advocate 
                                                 
152  See comments in relation to other guidelines released by the National Health and Medical Research 
Council in Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 37 (Chesterman J); YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (2005) 25 
VAR 1, [68] (Morris P).  
153  See Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation Authority Act 2008 (Cth) ss 9, 11. 
154  Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation Authority Act 2008 (Cth) s 11(1)(a). 
155  Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation Authority Act 2008 (Cth) s 4 (definition of 
‘organ or tissue donation and transplantation matter’). 
156  Email from Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation Authority to Shih-Ning Then, 29 
September 2009. 
157  Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation Authority Act 2008 (Cth) s 57. 
158  See further discussion in Keough, above n 132, 442–4. 
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for the child’s interests is not guaranteed in the different forums. As a 
consequence, decisions could be made without independent argument being put 
forward on behalf of the child. In some jurisdictions, the ability to obtain 
authorisation is relatively accessible, Victoria offers the most extreme example, 
where the consent of one medical practitioner together with the consent of a 
parent may be sufficient. Fundamental rule of law ideals of consistency and 
predictability are undermined in the situation where there are several fora that 
may authorise a procedure, many of which are not bound by precedent. The 
situation therefore of a child in an acutely vulnerable position is difficult to 
legally predict. 
These factors demonstrate that the status quo appears to be failing to reach 
the goal of consistent and appropriate protection of young children.  
In Australia, we are used to jurisdictional differences arising and, particularly 
in the context of health, to different legislative requirements causing operational 
issues.159 However, it is questioned whether this is justifiable in relation to 
invasive medical procedures, particularly regarding vulnerable young children. 
The concerns raised by overlapping and inconsistent jurisdictions in relation 
to medical procedures on children have been voiced elsewhere.160 The NSW Law 
Reform Commission Report on Young People and Consent to Health Care 
criticised the ‘uncertainty’, ‘confusion’ and ‘forum-shopping’161 that can result 
from the current situation.162 Chief among the protagonists for change has been 
Alastair Nicholson, former Chief Justice of the Family Court. Writing with 
others, he suggested: 
Uniform State and Territory legislation could overcome this problem or, a similar result 
could be achieved by the referral of powers by the States with respect to the jurisdiction. 
Another option would be for Commonwealth legislation based on the external affairs 
power pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.163 
                                                 
159  For example, the position in relation to guardianship legislation around Australia has garnered criticism: 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of 
Australia, Older People and the Law (2007) 121–2 [3.198]–[3.200].  
160  See, eg, NSW  Law Reform Commission, above n 44, 119 [8.64]; Alistair Nicholson, Margaret Harrison 
and Danny Sandor, ‘The Role of the Family Court in Medical Procedure Cases’(1996) 2 Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 242; Shaun Keays-Byrne, ‘Sterilisation of Children: The Need for Uniform 
Legislation’ (April/May/June 1995) On the Record 8, 9; Danny Sandor, ‘Sterilisation and Special 
Medical Procedures on Children and Young People. Blunt Instrument? Bad Medicine?’ in Ian Freckelton 
and Kerry Peterson (eds), Controversies in Health Law (Federation Press, 1999) 2, 14; Keough, above 
 n 132, 457. 
161  The ability to ‘forum-shop’ in Australia is protected by the immunity given to inter-state residents by 
 s 117 of the Constitution. The section provides that ‘A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall 
not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable 
to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.’ Justice Brennan said in Street v 
Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521 that the provision ‘opens … the doors of State 
universities, hospitals and other institutions for entry by subjects of the Queen resident in other States on 
the same terms as residents of the relevant State’ (emphasis added). 
162  While these views were expressed mainly in relation to authorisation for sterilisation of children, they are 
also relevant in this context, see: NSWLRC, Minors’ Consent, above n 45, [4.27], [4.29]; NSWLRC, 
Young People and Consent, above n 45, 210 [8.64].  
163  Nicholson, Harrison and Sandor, above n 160. 
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B Reform 
1 Avenues of Reform 
Nicholson identified three avenues for reform. First is the possibility that 
federal jurisdiction could be broadened pursuant to the external affairs power.164 
The Family Court in B v MIMIA held that the welfare jurisdiction in the FL Act 
was broadly applicable to all children, and supported by the external affairs 
power because it implemented the obligations under the CRC. The High Court 
overturned this broad interpretation of the welfare jurisdiction of the FL Act.165 
However it did not necessarily discount the possibility that such a broad 
jurisdiction could be vested in the Family Court pursuant to the external affairs 
power. Instead the High Court concluded that as it was presently drafted, it did 
not confer that jurisdiction.166  
There exists therefore a means by which the Commonwealth can ensure that 
consistent protection in this complex area is implemented across Australia; the 
real question is whether there exists the necessary political will. 
Second, Nicholson considered the possibility of developing uniform state and 
territory legislation. Uniform legislation is notoriously difficult to reach 
consensus upon and implement across each jurisdiction. Nonetheless, such a 
prospect seemed promising earlier this decade in relation to the creation of 
uniform legislation for the authorisation of sterilisation procedures on children 
without capacity. This was considered by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General but was withdrawn from their agenda in early 2008 on the basis that the 
number of sterilisations in Australia was significantly less than reported, 
education had assisted doctors and hospitals in understanding their legal 
obligations, alternatives to sterilisation were now available, and the existing 
processes in each jurisdiction seemed to be working adequately in light of these 
improvements.167 The Committee did not address, as a matter of legal principle, 
the confusion and overlap that still exists in this area (as it does in the area of 
tissue transplantation). How medical practitioners can be better educated about 
their legal obligations where the legal profession remains unsure how the regimes 
interact, is unclear. 
Third, Nicholson considered referral of powers by the states to the 
Commonwealth. It seems such a referral would be unnecessary given the breadth 
of the external affairs power, but it may be more politically palatable than a 
unilateral usurpation of jurisdiction by the Commonwealth. 
                                                 
164  Australian Constitution s 51(xxix). 
165  MIMIA v B (2004) 219 CLR 365, 405, 406–7 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 434 (Callinan J). See 
also 390 (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J), in which their Honours stated it is not necessary for them to decide 
the issue as, unlike in Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, they found there was no ‘matter’ that arose 
here, not dealing with the relationship between the parents, or duties or obligations owed by the parents to 
the children. 
166  Although contra the position of Callinan J in MIMIA v B (2004) 210 CLR 365, 441–2 [222], who 
believed that the CRC  may contain aspirational obligations only. 
167  Robert McClelland, ‘Standing Committee of Attorneys General Communiqué’ (Press Release, 28 March 
2008) 6–7. 
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2 A Reform Option from the UK: One Authority, Different Jurisdictions 
Given there exist avenues for achieving reform, it must be considered what 
form it may take. One option for a quasi federal regime could be modelled upon 
some aspects of the human tissue regulatory regime in the UK. Within the UK 
there is separate legislation regulating human tissue transplantation (including 
where a young child is donating specific tissue)168 in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland,169 and Scotland.170 Similar to the position here, the legislation 
within the UK jurisdictions makes it an offence to remove and use tissue from a 
living person for the purposes of transplantation,171 but specific exceptions are 
provided.172 As is the case in Australia, the legislation between the UK 
jurisdictions is similar, but not identical. Without delving fully into the 
complexities of another legislative tissue transplantation regime, there are some 
key features of the UK regime that are, for present purposes, useful to 
consider.173 
The UK Human Tissue Authority (‘HTA’)174 was established to, among 
other functions, licence and monitor those involved in the use of human tissue. 
Conditions of such licences include compliance with Codes of Practice regarding 
transplantation that the HTA issues and frequently updates.175 Throughout the 
UK, each jurisdiction has delegated power to the HTA176 to oversee and 
                                                 
168  The UK model as it applies to transplantation of bone marrow or peripheral blood stem cells from a child 
without capacity is focussed upon here.  
169  Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30; Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons Who Lack Capacity to Consent and 
Transplants) Regulations 2006 (UK).  
170  Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (Scot) asp 4; Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) 
Regulations 2006 (Scot). 
171  Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30, s 33(1)–(2); Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (Scot) asp 4,  
 s 17(1)(a).  
172  Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30, s 33(3)–(4) and Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons Who Lack Capacity 
to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 (UK) regs 10–12; Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 
(Scot) asp 4, s 17(4); Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (Scot) reg 
5. 
173  For more information about the regulatory system in the UK refer to the Human Tissue Authority 
website: Human Tissue Authority, HTA – The Human Tissue Authority (2010) <http://www.hta.gov.uk>. 
174  Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30, s 13.  
175  Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30, s 28. 
176  See Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 
(UK) regs 2 (definition of ‘Authority’), 11. For Scotland, reg 5 of the Human Organ and Tissue Live 
Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (Scot) requires the Scottish Ministers to make a decision 
regarding tissue donation. However, this power has been delegated to the Human Tissue Authority: see 
Scottish Government, Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006: A Guide to Its Implications for NHS Scotland 
(2006), 6 [27] 
<http://www.hta.gov.uk/_db/_documents/Information_about_HT_%28Scotland%29_Act.pdf>. 
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authorise certain types of tissue transplantations where the donor is a young 
child.177 
At a practical level, the regime requires the practitioner with responsibility 
for the donor to refer the matter to the HTA for authorisation if certain tissue is to 
be removed for transplantation from a child who lacks capacity.178 The HTA will 
investigate the case before making a determination and must, among other things, 
take into account evidence of duress or coercion,179 and be satisfied that no 
reward has been given and that the relevant consent has been obtained.180 The 
HTA will apply the relevant tests under the legislation of the different 
jurisdictions. However, only in Scotland does the ‘unwillingness’ of a donor 
child need to be expressly considered.181 
The HTA model therefore retains some of the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies evident in the current Australian position. However, it presents a 
model that, with modification, could be adopted in Australia to help standardise 
the approach to removal of tissue from young children without a complete 
takeover of the area by the Commonwealth. It would be an important part of any 
such model that the factors that the body must consider in the decision making 
process included the views of the child. 
This model allows different jurisdictions to coexist. It would, therefore, allow 
those states that have legislation prohibiting regenerative tissue transplantation 
from young children and other jurisdictions that allow such procedures to 
maintain these general policies. However, in those regimes where it was 
permitted, it would give power to a centralised body to authorise removal of 
tissue from young children using a consistent standard of assessment. A 
centralised body that is not a tribunal or a court that operates in an inquisitorial 
style will allow consistent, certain and efficient resolution regarding the question 
of authorisation and would ensure a child’s views were independently ascertained 
and assessed. Also, as in the UK, if there were any doubt or dispute about a 
situation or decision, recourse to the courts would still be available.182  
                                                 
177  Note, in the UK the common law still applies alongside the human tissue legislation so court 
authorisation may, in some circumstances, also be necessary: Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 
2 – Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation (September 2009) app A 
<http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code2donationoforgans.cf
m>; Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 6 – Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral 
Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation, (September 2009) app A 
<http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code6donationofbonemarr
ow.cfm>.  
178  Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) c 30, s 33(3); Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons Who Lack Capacity to 
Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 (UK) regs 10(3)(b), 11(2); Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 
2006 (Scot) asp 4, s 17(1)(a); Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 
(Scot) regs 5(1), (7). 
179  Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons Who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 
(UK) reg 11(8)(a); Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (Scot) reg 
5(9)(j). 
180  Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons Who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006 
(UK) reg 11(3); Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (Scot) reg 5(9). 
181  Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (Scot) reg 5(9)(i).  
182  See above n 177 and accompanying text. 
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Another important aspect of the HTA that should be incorporated in any new 
Australian regime is the flexibility that the Codes of Practice provide.183 These 
Codes allow the centralised body in effect to  issue guidance to practitioners to 
keep abreast with medical developments. This ensures regulation and standards 
do not become outdated, as has occurred under the older Australian tissue 
transplantation regimes. 
This model could operate concurrently with the parens patriae jurisdiction 
and federal jurisdiction under the FL Act, although the interrelationship between 
them ought to be clearly stated to avoid the confusion of the current regimes. 
This model of authorisation would ensure that, even where the courts are not 
involved, similar standards that are being used by the courts would still be 
applied.184 It would be hoped that a centralised body applying the best interests 
test would ensure a greater level of consistent protection for children that was 
easily accessible for practitioners and parents. 
 
3 Conclusion 
The government of Australia has an obligation to ensure children are 
protected and cared for. As a society, we also have a moral obligation to ensure 
this. The importance of protecting children through the adoption of the best 
interests principle has been recognised legally both domestically and 
internationally. The status of children as rights holders, and as being entitled to 
participate in any decision making process affecting them, is also recognised. 
This article has demonstrated that Australia, across its jurisdictions, is failing to 
meet its obligations in relation to prospective young child tissue donors. We have 
presented a number of avenues by which more consistent and certain protection 
of young children could be achieved and offered an example of how these 
obligations could be achieved modelled on the current the UK regime. 
 
 
  
                                                 
183  It is noted that in Western Australia the Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) already makes 
provision for such Codes: ss 32A, 32B. However, it does not appear that any Codes have been produced.  
184  Although it is conceded that there is likely to emerge differences in the application of similar legal tests: 
see, eg, Ford, above n 3. 
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 1 & 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
